One hundred twenty-eight armed conflicts since 1989 have resulted in at least 250,000 deaths each year. Serious injuries are even more numerous. Ratios of reported battlefield injuries to deaths vary from 2 to 28 injuries for every death.

Twenty-six million people worldwide had been displaced as a result of armed conflict at the end of 2008. The top six countries of origin of refugees in 2008 are locations of armed conflict.

Approximately 60 percent of serious human rights violations documented by Amnesty International in a 10-year structured sample involved the use of small arms and light weapons.

Child soldiers have been actively involved in conflict in government forces or non-state armed groups in 19 countries since 2004.

Armed violence often results in the destruction of socio-economic infrastructure and markets, corruption and diversion of public finance, and denial of access to healthcare, water, food, shelter and education.

The toll outside of traditional armed conflicts is also great. Non-conflict armed killings are estimated at around 300,000 each year.

These numbers make clear the urgent need to better regulate the trade in conventional weapons. While some countries have strict controls in place, globally the strength of legislation and enforcement varies greatly and the resulting patchwork of regulation has allowed far too many arms to be shipped to countries with dismal human rights records or to conflict zones where the arms exacerbate the violence or facilitate repression and grave human rights abuses.

The U.N. General Assembly Acts

After years of campaigning for the establishment of an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) by supporters, in December 2009, the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution A/64/48 which decided, among other things, to convene “the United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty to sit for four consecutive weeks in 2012 to elaborate a legally binding instrument on the highest possible common international standards for the transfer of conventional arms,” with Preparatory Conferences in 2011 and 2012, to be undertaken “in an open and transparent manner, on the basis of consensus, to achieve a strong and robust treaty.”2

The resolution, which was adopted by a vote of 151 in favor to one against, with 20 abstentions, highlighted the importance of respecting international humanitarian and human rights law in arms transfers and recognized the role weak international arms transfer controls play in exacerbating armed conflict, the displacement of people, organized crime, terrorism and damage to socio-economic development.

Work towards an Arms Trade Treaty

Works towards a global treaty to control the trade in conventional arms has been ongoing for more than a decade. In 1995, a number of Nobel Laureates, including Dr. Oscar Arias, as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as Amnesty International, Saferworld and the British American Security Information Council proposed such a treaty, initially called “The International Code of Conduct” (a title used by United States Senator John Kerry when he and others successfully introduced a bill in the U.S. Congress mandating the U.S. president to negotiate such an agreement). By 2000, the revamped proposal, which was circulated at the U.N. by Costa Rica, was called “The Framework Convention on International Arms Transfers.”

In 2003, Amnesty International, the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), and Oxfam launched the Control Arms Campaign, which is made up of hundreds of NGOs worldwide and coordinates civil society efforts in support of what is now called an “Arms Trade Treaty.”

The Control Arms Campaign welcomed General Assembly resolution A/64/48 as a step in the right direction, although it expressed reservations about the proposed procedure for the 2012 U.N. Conference that could give every state the right of veto instead of a majority vote over final decisions on the Treaty. The majority of states that submitted their views on an Arms Trade Treaty to the U.N. Secretary-General in 2007 supported the idea that international humanitarian and human rights law should be a consideration in the Treaty, while other states expressed the need for safeguards to prevent arms transfers that would violate U.N. arms embargoes or be used for, amongst other things, terrorist attacks.

U.N. Preparatory Committee 2010

Over 100 states took part in the first U.N. Preparatory Committee meetings for the Arms Trade Treaty held in New York from 12 - 23 July 2010, during which diplomats discussed the purposes and principles, as well as the scope, parameters and implementation mechanisms of the Treaty.3

Ambassador Roberto García Moritán, the chair of the U.N. ATT process, submitted a draft paper on 22 July 2010, based on states’ views, proposing that the goals of an ATT would include eradicating the illegal trade and “prevent[ing] international transfers of conventional arms that contribute to or facilitate human suffering, serious violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law…thereby undermining sustainable social and economic development.” 4

These goals are vital for an ATT to have relevance and legitimacy amongst the world’s people. To achieve them, states will have to develop concrete provisions on the Treaty’s scope and parameters, which will be the key to determining the third aspect of the ATT – the implementation mechanisms.

Parameters of an ATT

Preparatory Committee discussions on parameters focused on the criteria states should consider when making a decision about an international arms transfer. The Control Arms Campaign advocates that an ATT require states to deny or revoke a license for an international arms transfer where there is a substantial risk that the arms will be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international human rights law or international humanitarian law. The Campaign is very concerned that some states are seeking to water down the Treaty’s provisions by requiring only that states “take into account” a number of “factors” when deciding if a transfer should proceed, including international human rights law, international humanitarian law, terrorism and organized crime.  Some senior diplomats have admitted that such a clause could be interpreted by states as “feel free to ignore” thus rendering the ATT toothless.

There is a real need for a robust risk assessment process in the ATT, as demonstrated by numerous past instances where arms proliferation has fueled persistent acts of brutality and terror. Even situations where arms transfers have ultimately been prevented can provide object lessons in the extraordinary efforts it can take to prevent such shipments. The example of an attempted transfer to Zimbabwe is a case in point.

In 2002, in response to gross violations of human rights, the European Union imposed an arms embargo on Zimbabwe (which was subsequently imposed by other states as well); two years later the EU strengthened its embargo to specifically include equipment “which might be used for internal repression.”

In 2008, Zimbabwe erupted in violence. Supporters of the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front and members of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (sometimes with the involvement of or at the direction of the country’s military and police) engaged in a brutal campaign of torture, arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, systematic violations of freedom of expression and assembly, and systematic violations of economic and social rights, including mass forced evictions and house burnings.5

On 10 April 2008, an arms shipment destined for use by the Zimbabwe Defence Force from a Chinese arms company (including three million rounds of small arms ammunition and rocket-propelled grenades) arrived in the South African port of Durban. On 14 April 2008, the shipment was reportedly granted a South African arms transit license, but dockworkers in Durban refused to unload the cargo. Church leaders sought and obtained a legal injunction to stop the shipment, and as the ship sailed away international civil society including IANSA and Amnesty International mobilized to halt the shipment. Mozambique reportedly refused to allow the ship into its waters; Namibian lawyers, churches and trade unions prepared to stop it; and Angola reportedly also refused to allow the arms to offload and transit to Zimbabwe. Finally, on 24 April, the arms shipment was recalled to China.

Ultimately this shipment was prevented, but only through extraordinary efforts. In far too many cases such efforts fail, thus the need for a risk assessment process, to prevent serious violations of human rights law by stopping those transfers of arms where there is a substantial risk that those violations could occur.

Discussions on Scope of Equipment

To be effective and relevant, an ATT should apply to the broadest range of conventional arms and ammunition, and reflect best practices already in place. Amnesty International believes that the broad range of items already controlled by states as part of their national export-import regimes provide a sufficient basis for broad agreement on what equipment the Treaty should cover.7

However, discussions on what items should constitute “conventional arms” within the Treaty have been stuck within a limited formula called "7+1." This formula refers to the seven categories of offensive weapons in the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms, plus small arms and light weapons.8 Apart from the inclusion of small arms and light weapons, the “7+1” formula for an ATT would have a limited impact because it too narrowly defines offensive weapons and excludes weapons, munitions and materiel that have been misused in many countries. For example, if these seven categories were employed they would include “attack helicopters,” “armoured fighting vehicles” and “jet fighters,” but exclude all “military helicopters,” “armoured vehicles,” and “military aircraft.” Thus, most states wish to see the seven Register categories expanded.
 
While expanding the categories is vital, there are also other problems of scope that need to be addressed. For example, even the expanded 7+1 categories exclude munitions (including ammunition and explosives). Thus, to add munitions states have been discussing a “7+1+1” formula, but as currently envisioned this formula also falls short, excluding certain munitions that are not considered “military” yet are often used in law enforcement operations. Such items are already included in most states’ export control lists and should be included in an ATT as well.

Forms of International Transfer and Transaction

The ATT must also include a definition of an “international transfer,” as well as the “forms of international transfer” and the “associated transactions” for those transfers. Under the U.N. Register, international arms transfers involve, in addition to the physical movement of equipment into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the equipment.

During the Preparatory Committee meeting, the following activities were identified as potentially falling within the scope of forms of transfers:

“Import, Export, Re-export, Temporary Re-export, Trans-shipment, Transit, Brokering, Artisanal Manufacture, Technology Transfer, Manufacture under Foreign License, Leases, Loans, Gifts, Technical Assistance, Promotion and, Research, Financing, Training.”

The Treaty should reflect at least the existing best practice standards on arms export control and be consistent with the overwhelming majority of current national law. These include the regulation of:

(a) all types of international transfers, including the transit and transhipment of arms through a state's territory;

(b) all activities necessary for the actual arrangement and delivery of irresponsible arms transfers such as brokering, transportation and financial transactions;

(c) all state-to-state transfers undertaken under bilateral military agreements.

Since 1995, Amnesty International has published numerous examples of irresponsible arms brokering, including the supply of arms to the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide. We have highlighted the need to control arms brokering and transport service providers, most recently in “Deadly Movements: Arms Transportation Controls in the Arms Trade Treaty” (July 2010).9 The report cites as an example a case where machine gun/anti-aircraft gun parts from Bulgaria were flown on an Air France passenger flight from Sofia to Paris in September 2008. The shipment was then flown to Nairobi with the final destination listed in the transport documents as Kigali. There was a substantial risk that the shipment, which was procured by the Rwanda government, would be diverted to armed groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo, as such weapons have been used in such fighting in that country. Despite such a likelihood, the Bulgarian, French and Kenyan governments all permitted the export and transit of the arms shipment from or through their territories. Such transfers must be addressed by an ATT.

The Way Ahead
 
It is crucial that the large majority of states that want a principled and effective ATT remain committed to setting “the highest possible standards” for the international arms trade. These standards must prevent irresponsible transfers that are used for grossly harmful and illegal purposes, including serious violations of international human rights law. To enable a strong outcome states must, among other things, interpret the rule of consensus in a sensible and fair manner so the final outcome reflects the will of the greatest majority of states. Clearly, it would be disappointing if a small number of states restricted the development of high standards or limited the application of the Treaty to inadequate categories of arms and ammunition. All necessary steps must be taken in the next Preparatory Committee and during the Treaty negotiations to ensure that the result is an ATT that will save lives and improve human security.
 
Brian Wood and Alberto Estévez are, respectively, the Arms Control, Security Trade and Human Rights Manager and the Advocacy Coordinator of Military, Security and Police Transfers at the International Secretariat of Amnesty International.
 
Notes

1. For further details on sources, see “Killer Facts: the impact of the irresponsible arms trade on lives, rights and livelihoods” at www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ACT30/005/2010/en.
2. The full text of the resolution is available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/464/71/PDF/N0946471.pdf?OpenElement.
3. NGOs in the Control Arms Campaign took this opportunity to arrange meetings with member states’ delegations in the U.N., hold fringe meetings with expert speakers and to circulate policy papers on the Treaty issues being discussed. See the Control Arms website for more information at www.controlarms.org/en.
4. Summaries of the discussions by states on the Treaty during these two weeks are contained in the final Chairman’s Draft Paper on Principles, and the “friends of the Chair” Facilitators’ Summaries on the Scope, Parameters and Implementation provisions of the Treaty.  See www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/ATTPrepCom/index.htm.
5. Amnesty International, “Zimbabwe: A trail of violence after the ballot,” June 2008. Available online at www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR46/014/2008/en.
6. The International Committee of the Red Cross, Amnesty International and Oxfam have published “practical guides” which make clear that such measures should be designed as narrow and preventive rather than broad and punitive, involving case by case assessment and not the imposition of blanket sanctions. Under the Treaty, states would be required to refuse, revoke or amend authorization for the transfer of arms in question until the substantial risk of serious violations using such arms has been curtailed through remedial action. See ICRC, “Arms transfer decisions: Applying international humanitarian law criteria”  at www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/p0916; Amnesty International, “How to Apply Human Rights Standards to Arms Transfer Decisions” at www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ACT30/008/2008/en; and Oxfam, “Practical Guide: Applying Sustainable Development to Arms-Transfer Decisions” at www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/tb-practical-guide-arms-trade-decisions-apr09.pdf.
7. States have largely agreed the following items and activities should not be within the scope of the ATT: internal transfers, national ownership and regulation of weapons, and antique weapons. Some states question the inclusion of rifles for sporting and hunting and NGOs have proposed simplified procedures for these firearms to be included under an ATT.
8. Established in 1992, the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms is a transparency and confidence-building measure that includes data provided by states on international arms transfers. It covers the export and import of seven categories of major conventional arms, namely, battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships (including submarines), as well as missiles and missile launchers. To learn more go to www.un.org/disarmament.
9. The full report is available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ACT30/015/2010/en/7898d591-f17a-4d8b-9836-17c3b9a11df3/act300152010en.pdf.